Who Should Decide Whether the Apple is Rotten? Tax Disclosure and Corporate Political Agency by Benshalom, Ilan
WHO SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE APPLE 
IS ROTTEN?  TAX DISCLOSURE AND 







Enron-type corporate financial accounting scandals in the beginning of the 
millennium have given rise to a renewed interest in corporate tax disclosure.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggesting a connection between corporate fraud and aggressive tax planning 
has motivated academics and policymakers to reconsider tax disclosure as a way to 
monitor corporate governance and limit tax avoidance.  This article offers a different 
perspective on tax disclosure, tying it to the broader question of how policymakers should 
monitor the political impact of corporate business activities.  
The article claims that policymakers should view corporations’ tax planning 
strategies as part of a broader corporate political impact on social issues.  This impact 
results from the genuine difficulty of bifurcating corporate business decisions from their 
political ones.  This difficulty is a result of many judgment calls required in such 
decisions, which relate to individuals’ moral and political preferences.  Tax planning is 
one of these mixed business-political decisions, and the article advances the notion that 
policymakers should analyze tax planning not only as a law enforcement issue, but also 
through corporate governance lenses.  To establish this inquiry, the article explains why 
the investor-shareholder relationship gives rise to political agency problems, which 
neither traditional nor critical corporate law literatures recognize.  It then demonstrates 
how the costs associated with this type of agency relationship could be reduced via 
disclosure of information about the impact of corporate activities on issues of political 
concern.  The article uses insights from financial markets theory to explain how 
disclosure of non-financial information would help to better align corporate actions with 
the political preferences of shareholders, despite shareholder rational passivity and 
apathy.  It is then illustrated, through the Apple case, how policymakers can use the 
theoretical conclusions reached through this analysis to formulate a real world policy 
proposal with respect to corporation tax planning.  Through its use of a wide range of 
interdisciplinary resources, this article aims to reformulate the multi-layered inquiry 
over the benefits and costs associated with corporate tax disclosure.   
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“Apple carefully manages its foreign cash holdings to support its overseas operations in 
the best interests of its shareholders . . . Apple serves its shareholders by keeping these 
funds overseas”  
(Apple’s Senate submission)1 
 
“There’s something fundamentally wrong when the wealthiest company in America pays 
12.6% in taxes, while [many small businesses]. . . pay a rate nearly three times higher. 
And it’s not just savvy accounting or a strategic maneuver—Apple’s tax avoidance has a 
profoundly damaging effect on our whole country”  





A corporation’s value to society can be judged not only by what it gives, but also 
by what it chooses to withhold.  Nowhere is this more evident than corporate tax 
policies.
3
  This article advances this observation by focusing on the idea of greater 
corporate tax disclosure.  It ties together two, seemingly distinct, topics that have 
attracted considerable academic interest in recent years: public finance interest on the 
impact of mandatory tax disclosure on tax evasion and avoidance activities,
4
 and 




The article argues that behind the somewhat instrumentalist view of public 
finance lies an underlying and profound notion about the role of corporate power in 
society.  Therefore, tax policymakers should consider the potential impact and structure 
of a future tax disclosure regime as part of a broader goal—promoting accountable 
corporate conduct.  The need to promote this accountability arises in business decisions, 
like tax planning, which reflect certain inherently moral and political preferences about 
what is a legitimate way to pursue profits.  





) academic attention, the actions of corporations 
                                                          
1 TESTIMONY OF APPLE INC., Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the Comm. On Homeland Sec. and 
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (written testimony of Timothy Cook, Chief Exec. Officer, Apple Inc.), 
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=e0a00aaa-f4a1-4fa0-b5b2-563b86a7588a 
[hereinafter “Apple’s Testimony”].  
2 Brian Levin, Op-Ed, Letter to Apple CEO Tim Cook from a Disgruntled Shareholder, 
HUFFINGTON POST, May 21, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-levin/letter-to-apples-
tim-cook_b_3311215.html. 
3 Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, CSR and Taxation: The Missing Link, LEADING 
PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2006, at 4 (noting that taxes are the most visible and straightforward contribution that 
corporations make to non-shareholders and non-employees). 
4 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
5 See discussion infra Part I.  
6 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) denies the tax exemption for NPOs; I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) denies charitable relief 
from contributions made to tax-exempt social welfare organizations that are allowed to lobby. See also 
Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political 
Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV 875, 878–80 (2001); Meghan J. Ryan, Can the IRS 
Silence Religious Organizations?, 40 IND. L. REV. 73, 79–80 (2007); Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences 
When Churches Participate in Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 156–59 (2007). 
7 The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United placed the controversy over the political identity 
of corporations at the center of the debate about the role of corporate money in democratic elections. See 
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inevitably have a substantial political impact on a wide range of issues, which may not be 
directly related to elections.  There is no one “right” way for doing business, and the 
decision to pursue one avenue over another cannot be separated from moral, ideological, 
and political preferences.
8
  Hence, since corporations play an important role in the 
modern economy, the notion that they do not or should not have a political impact is 
utterly unrealistic.  
Tim Cook’s well-publicized Senate testimony about Apple’s tax planning 
strategies offers a good example of this difficulty.  In reply to questions about parking 
billions of dollars in subsidiaries not subject to tax in any country, Cook asserted that 
Apple is an American company of strong values that believes that “to whom much is 
given much is required.”  Apple also claimed that its tax planning was done on behalf of 
its shareholders—thus failing to recognize the potential variation in its shareholders’ 
political views about the legitimacy of its somewhat controversial profit-maximizing 
strategy. 
This article tackles this topic head on, aiming to define what comprises corporate 
political agency in modern markets.  It uses the example of tax disclosure to 
meaningfully discuss how problems associated with corporate political agency should be 
regulated.  It explores an aggressive yet perfectly legal tax planning structure employed 
by Apple, which allowed the company to report and retain its foreign earnings in a tax-
free Bermuda subsidiary.  It argues that the decision of what comprises legitimate tax 
planning is, at the end of the day, a matter of moral and political preferences.  The fact 
that it has financial significance should not cloud its political impact or the obligation of 
Apple, as an agent, to adequately convey this political impact to its principals.  
The article’s analysis connects CSR, corporate tax planning and corporate tax 
disclosure by engaging in an interdisciplinary inquiry that touches upon public finance 
and business science literatures as well as political philosophy, corporate law, and critical 
legal theory.  The core of the argument is that recent changes in investment patterns—
namely the emergence of portfolio investment patterns and the growing importance of 
institutional investors—have resulted in political agency problems.  In conducting 
ordinary business activities, corporations are required to make judgment calls about 
issues that are inevitably political, such as what comprises legitimate tax planning.  Yet, 
because of common action problems associated with modern investment patterns, most of 
the political dimensions of corporate business decisions cannot adequately reflect the 
preferences of their principals.  
The article seeks to make the following contributions.  First, it argues that the 
relevant inquiry is not whether socially responsible corporations should engage in 
specific tax-planning strategies.  Instead, the relevant question is how corporations can 
best fulfill their political agency when making ordinary business decisions (such as tax 
planning) that have political implications.  In other words, responsible corporations are 
those that adequately reflect the political preferences of their shareholders.  CSR should 
therefore be understood as an internal standard reflective of shareholders’ aggregated 
                                                                                                                                                              
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Francis Bingham, Show Me the Money: Public Access and 
Accountability After Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027 (2011) (noting that it has been called both a 
broadside assault on democracy and a victory for free speech and that these extreme reactions suggest the 
importance of the case); Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United V. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big 
Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (2011). 
8 The definition of the term “preferences” is beyond the scope of this analysis. This article uses it 
broadly to include both principles and conventions. 
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preferences rather than as an amorphous external standard of “social” conduct.  
Second, this article argues that recent changes in investment patterns—namely 
the shift to non-control, intermediated, and retail-diversified portfolio investments—have 
resulted in political agency problems.  Put differently, it argues that while the change in 
investment patterns has many positive outcomes (namely risk diversification), it also has 
negative externalities on the political process.  These externalities are inconsistent with 
some basic notions of democratic participation and decision-making. 
Third, the article suggests that the negative externalities caused by the change in 
investment patterns can be corrected by disclosure.  The efficient market hypothesis, 
which justifies financial disclosure, explains why non-financial disclosure would have a 
significant real world impact on corporations.  With respect to financial disclosure, the 
efficient market hypothesis contends that policymakers should not be concerned with 
retail investors’ lack of financial literacy.  Professional investors, who analyze the 
disclosed information, are marginal buyers and sellers who correct for mispricing. This is 
also true with non-financial disclosure.  While retail investors are unlikely to change their 
behavior with more information, sophisticated players (e.g., media organizations, 
competitors, and NGOs) would.  Thus, even though the shareholders’ apathy results in 
problematic corporate-political accountability, the remedy should not necessarily aim to 
increase individual shareholders’ involvement or activism.  In fact, much of the answer 
to what comprises legitimate corporate conduct will come as a result of the actions taken 
by well-informed “professional” parties.  Hence, just as in the case of financial 
disclosure, the success of a non-financial disclosure regime does not depend on whether 
it actually changes the behavior of individual investors, but on how it affects the overall 
(not necessarily investment) behavior of professional players.  To the extent that 
corporate conduct on certain issues seems unjustified, non-financial disclosure would 
generate socio-political reactions, and these costs may alter the corporate cost-benefit 
equilibrium on this issue.  
 The article then explains how its new formulation of CSR interacts with the 
public finance scholarship on tax disclosure.  The notion of tax planning is ideal because 
it reflects corporations’ obligation toward society.  Because tax planning is legal, 
traditional corporate law scholarship suggests that managers have an obligation to 
undertake legal (yet aggressive) tax minimization strategies to maximize shareholders’ 
returns.  However, many corporations refrain from aggressive measures in avoiding 
taxes, which is antithetical to what they are “rationally” expected to do to maximize the 
financial return on their shareholders’ investment.  The article addresses this issue by 
relying on the public finance literature dealing with the impact of disclosing corporate tax 
returns. 
Part I provides an overview of the CSR literature.  Part II explains the concept of 
corporate political agency, the negative externalities of portfolio investments on 
democratic participation, and why disclosure may help solve some of these problems.  It 
then assesses the strengths and weaknesses of using disclosure to address corporate 
political agency problems.  Part III explains how disclosure could be implemented with 
respect to corporate tax planning strategies, analyzing how such a disclosure regime 
would help determine whether specific tax planning strategies, such as Apple’s no-
country tax resident subsidiaries, are legitimate tax planning avenues. 
II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONTEXT 
The article argues that policymakers should view tax disclosure as a corporate 
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governance issue that relates to the broader questions of CSR, and not only as a 
mechanism for promoting tax compliance.  This Part provides a synoptic review of the 
relevant CSR literature.  Part I.A gives the background of CSR and the recent academic 
interest in it.  The analysis of Part I.B extracts three core truisms from the CSR agenda: 
the notion that corporate officers should take into account the externalities of corporate 
activities; the notion of welfare (not wealth) maximization; and the idea that there is a 
change in the nature of agency costs associated with the growth of portfolio investments.
9
 
A. Corporate Social Responsibility in Context 
The traditional corporate law model views corporate managers and employees as 
agents invested with the fiduciary duty of maximizing the wealth of their principals (that 
is, their shareholders).
10
  This model argues that corporations are more easily monitored 
when corporate managers have a single class of principals (that is, shareholders entitled 
to residual benefits) and a single goal (wealth maximization).
11
  The resulting benefit of 
this simplified monitoring is a reduction in agency costs, which, in turn, increases the 
value of the corporate venture.
12
  
The CSR movement objects to this traditional view, arguing that it fails to 
promote an optimal corporate regime.
13
  Theorists, such as Einer Elhauge and Cynthia 
Williams, stress that shareholder wealth maximization should not be the only principle 
that governs corporate law.  Instead, corporate law should allow managers to undertake 
activities that do not necessarily increase shareholders’ wealth, and also to be held 
                                                          
9 See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
10 This principal-agent model, with its sole wealth maximization objective, has been the core of 
Anglo-American corporate law for centuries and is widely supported by the majority of corporate law 
scholars, including Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, Daniel Fischel, Henry Hansmann, Jonathan Macey 
and Roberta Romano. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 453–54 (2007); Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Virginia Harper Ho, 
"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder–Stakeholder Divide, 36 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 59, 71–77 (2010); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of 
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 711–18 (2002); Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. The notion 
that wealth maximization is the dominant view is undisputed, even by its critics. See Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment and Corporate Law, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 99, 101. (2011). See also Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: 
Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 
983 (2011). 
11 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 733, 736 
(2005) (describing this argument). For one of the most canonic expression for this “traditional” view of 
corporate law, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 37–39 (1991). 
12  Accordingly, corporate law should require managers only to increase shareholders’ wealth. 
Other goals, which may concern the welfare of other parties affected by corporate activity, should therefore 
be promoted or protected through other means.  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11; David G. Yosifon, 
The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 
N.C.L. REV. 1197, 1200–01 (2011); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 538 (2006). The core assumption is that a bigger pie could serve everybody 
better. For example, voluntary creditors (e.g., debtors and employees) would be compensated by higher 
returns on their investment. By the same token, the state would be better off if it took the position of 
involuntary creditors (e.g., individuals negatively affected by corporate externalities) by regulating these 
externalities directly or indirectly (e.g., via tort litigation). Goals other than wealth maximization are best 
promoted through the political arena. 
13 Andere Crane et al., Introduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 363, 377 (Andere Crane et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]. 
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publicly accountable for certain efforts (even if legal) to increase corporate profitability.
14
  
Despite its intuitive appeal, the CSR agenda raises serious problems that are 
difficult to reconcile.
15
  The most fundamental concern is that it remains unclear how 
CSR theory, given its public good characteristics, can have any significant effect on 
corporate behavior.  
It can be disputed whether the traditional argument against CSR initiatives, 
which stresses that these initiatives tend to be managerial pet projects that significantly 
increase agency costs, is indeed correct.
16
  However, it is unquestionable that CSR 
objectives—e.g., environmental protection, education, and equality—are public goods.  
In a price-sensitive, competitive market, private actors generally do not supply public 
goods voluntarily; managers who choose to do so in place of tangible financial benefits 
would be driven out of the market.
17
  Rather, in profit-oriented product markets, financial 
markets, and managerial markets, decisions are made in response to competitive 
pressures.  These pressures should render the legal articulation of managerial fiduciary 




B. The Three Undisputable Cornerstones of the CSR Critique 
I begin from a conservative, non-controversial starting point from which I will 
develop my arguments with respect to CSR.  Throughout this analysis I assume that 
traditional corporate law theorists are correct in arguing that corporate managers should 
be seen only as agents of their shareholders, and not as agents of a more diversified group 
of stakeholders.
19
  Accepting this assumption is not of descriptive or normative value—it 
does not suggest that strong-form shareholder centrism is the established law or the 
desired corporate law framework.  Instead, this assumption is of instrumental value, 
showing that the Article’s analysis, which leads to a very different conclusion from law 
and economic analysis of corporate law, can align even with this “traditional” framework 
of corporate law theory.  
It is important to stress that traditional corporate law scholars do not claim that 
wealth maximization is a goal in itself, but merely that it is an efficient means for 
promoting overall welfare.  This article does not deny that wealth is often a proxy for 
welfare, or that there can be a socially productive division of labor—one that would 
encourage corporations to focus primarily on their profits and allow other objectives to be 
pursued elsewhere.  However, based on the CSR critique, this article’s analysis makes 
three central observations explaining why wealth maximization often falls short of 
                                                          
14 See generally Elhauge, supra note 11, at 733 (providing a comprehensive review of the various 
justifications to allow corporate managers to deviate from the wealth maximization principle). 
15 J. Van Oosterhout & P.P.M.A.R. Heugens, Much Ado About Nothing: A Conceptual Critique of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 197, 198; Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N. Global 
Compact and Accountability of Transnational Corporations: Separating Myth from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT'L 
L. 1, 22–25 (2007) (noting that the global compact—the leading UN document providing guidelines for 
MNEs—is intentionally vague). 
16 Lee, supra note 12, at 551 (arguing that stakeholder and team-production theories do not 
specifically address the problem of enhanced agency costs). 
17  DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 71–72 (2005); Peter Utting, The Struggle for Corporate 
Accountability, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 959, 969 (2008) (reaching the conclusion that voluntary action is not 
enough). 
18 D. Gordon Smith, The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 985, 989 (2008). 
19 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 90; Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, 
and The "Responsible" Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 38 (2005). 
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providing an adequate proxy for welfare. 
First, to help corporations generate value, a legal regime should force 
corporations to internalize the various externalities associated with their operation.
20
  The 
problem of holding private parties accountable for the externalities of their actions is not 
unique to corporations and decision-making by their managers.  However, in the case of 
large corporations, the issue of externalities is more significant due to the entities’ 
dominant economic position and the large breadth and scale of their activities.
21
  
Additionally, some of the mechanisms that would typically restrain parties from 
generating negative externalities on their surroundings do not exist in the context of 
multinational enterprises (or MNEs).  The potential separation of corporate decision-
makers from shareholders makes the corporate structure more susceptible to externalizing 
its costs to those who are not directly accounted for in its financial calculus.
22
  For 
example, shareholders who would tend to feel socially restrained from imposing certain 
negative externalities may not feel these pressures (and actually may not be even aware 




Furthermore, the shareholder wealth maximization principle assumes that 
governments are the most efficient bodies to manage the incentives of actors whose 
activities impose externalities.
24
  This assumption may be somewhat weakened by the 
complexity of the issues at stake, the relative weakness of certain governments, the 
information-asymmetry problems of government officials with respect to the wide range 
of implications that different forms of corporate conduct generate, and the time and 
transaction costs associated with the enactment of government regulations.
25
  
Second, corporate managers, as shareholders’ agents, should aim to maximize 
their welfare
26
 rather than their wealth.  The wealth maximization principle wrongly 
assumes an artificial separation between individuals’ goals in their capacity as 
investors—maximizing the returns for their investments—and goals they have in other 
capacities.  Individuals have a range of preferences, including commitments to a wide 
range of political and ethical issues that are not self-serving; naturally, these preferences 
                                                          
20 BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT LAW REGULATING THE UNSEEN 
POLLUTERS 514 (2008) (arguing that the only permissible financial returns should be those achieved while 
accounting for public costs to the environment and social welfare); R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder 
Theory and the Basis for Capitalism, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
52, 67 (2011); Andrew Johnston, Facing up to Social Cost: The Real Meaning of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221, 221 (2011) (noting that CSR should not include managers’ attempts 
to increase value for shareholders via green-marketing strategies). 
21 Yosifon, supra note 12, at 1204 (arguing that large corporations have an advantage in promoting 
their interests in the political arena). 
22 Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith, Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 947, 
959 (2008). 
23 Elhauge, supra note 11, at 756. 
24 GEOFFREY HEAL, WHEN PRINCIPLES PAY, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOTTOM 
LINE 9–10 (2008).  
25 Lorenzo Sacconi, Introduction, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, at xv (noting that a Causian account of the CSR issue is that, in the real world, both 
government and corporate governance suffer from transaction costs); Elhauge, supra note 11, at 802. 
26 The concept of welfare is amorphous and tricky. This article addresses it in a broad sense to 
include any type of fulfillment of society’s preferences, principles, and conceptions of not necessarily selfish 
ways to promote the public good. Under this definition, if altruistic preferences are met, then welfare would 
increase even when society bears a cost. 
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also relate to business and investment decisions.
27
  The act of investment does not 






Traditional corporate law scholars would argue that the heterogeneity of 
shareholder preferences requires managers to focus only on the common denominator—
the interest in increasing the (risk-adjusted) return on their investments.  Nevertheless, 
even these scholars would concede that most shareholders would refrain from investing 
in certain highly contested issues (e.g., privately supplied military services,
29
 legal 
prostitution, extreme pornography, etc.).
30
  In these cases, it is clear that the division of 
labor, which assumes that allowing corporations to focus only on maximizing their 
profits will increase shareholders’ welfare, breaks down.  Even if such corporate conduct 
increases shareholders’ material wealth, it would undermine the non-wealth related 
values and preferences that many shareholders have, and may ultimately reduce their 
overall welfare.
31
  Hence, especially with respect to the extreme issues mentioned above, 
managers’ commitment to maximizing shareholders’ wealth can lead to a non-welfare 
maximizing course of action.
32
  
The third and most crucial point that should be extracted from the CSR agenda is 
the changing nature of corporations due to a massive shift towards non-controlling share 
ownership.  Corporate law is concerned with enabling an institutional framework that can 
productively use different types of inputs from various contributors.
33
  Most importantly, 
it helps establish a reliable agency relationship that allows contributors of capital to 
supervise how others manage the business they own.
34
  
During the course of the twentieth century, corporate law regimes and capital 
markets evolved significantly, changing the patterns of investment.  As part of these 
changes, there has been a decline in the volume of economic activity by family-owned 
corporations and a rise in MNEs that rely on regulated financial markets as their primary 
source of capital.  On the investment level, there has been an increase in the amount of 
non-controlled (dispersed) ownership of corporate equity and portfolio investments, in 
which investors are rationally passive and concerned primarily with diversification to 
attain (average) market returns.
35
  Additionally, there has been a radical increase in the 
amount of assets that are invested through institutional investors—namely pension funds 
                                                          
27 Freeman et al., supra note 20, at 53–54. 
28 RICHARDSON, supra note 20, at 20–27 (providing evidence of shareholders' increased interest in 
financially insignificant political spending of corporations). 
29 PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 
217–22 (2003) (discussing some of the moral problems associated with the services provided by 
corporations, such as executive outcome to governments of various developing countries). 
30 For further discussion of why individuals would care about these issues even if they do not invest 
or vote according to them, see infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
31 Lee, supra note 19, at 48 (noting that the assumption that shareholders care about the ethical 
implications of their investment decisions would be idealistic but not unreasonable).  
32 Elhauge, supra note 11, at 738–39. 
33 Greenfield & Smith, supra note 22, at 958. 
34 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
35 See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 378–79, 405 (2005) (describing the rationale behind passive 
portfolio investment strategies, in which small investors know that it is costly and unlikely that they can 
achieve higher-than-market returns and instead focus on diversification and indexing the market); Bernard S. 
Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 813 
(1992); Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 542–
46 (2003) (describing the growth in portfolio investment even in the international investment context).  
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managing the retirement savings of individuals in the developed world.
36
  Like retail 
investors, institutional investors engage in non-control portfolio investment practices.  
These changes in investment patterns are all connected—they relate to the need for risk 
diversification and the difficulty for individual investors and investment managers in 
generating sufficient expertise in different economic fields.
37
  The effect of these trends 
has been amplified by the liberalization of global markets and the risks and advantages 
associated with investing abroad in a growing but volatile global economy.
38
  
Although the shift to non-control forms of investment (hereinafter referred to as 
“portfolio investment/ors”) allows more risk-taking, and thereby stimulates economic 
growth, it has also materially changed the shareholder-manager relationship.  Portfolio 
investor shareholders no longer have an effective way of actively influencing corporate 
behavior by voicing their concerns.  They do, however, have an easy way to execute exit 
options.  Hence, the transferability of shares and the liquidity of financial markets 
compensate for shareholders’ lack of control and allow them to maintain low agency 
costs by easily shifting out of investments.
39
  
This state of affairs has two important implications for the analysis.  First, it 
increases the group of equity shareholders to include almost everyone in society, because 
institutional (namely pension fund) investors do much of the portfolio investment on 
behalf of a wide range of individual investors.  This growth in the class of shareholders 
blurs the classic distinction between shareholders and other parties associated with the 
corporate venture (e.g., consumers).  
Second, even though shareholders can elect the board of directors and 
management team, small retail investors are voiceless and do not have the means to affect 
corporate conduct.
40
  This absence of a voice for portfolio investors in corporate control 
is particularly noticeable in the context of investments mediated by institutional investors, 
especially insurance companies and pension funds.
41
  These institutional investors are 
generally expected to maintain adequate levels of savings, so government regulation and 
market forces focus managerial incentives on maximizing profits.
42
  Thus, when investing 
through institutional investors, individual investors’ preferences on non-profit 
maximization issues remain unheard, even with respect to issues that they greatly care 
                                                          
36 RICHARDSON, supra note 20, at 45–46; Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Market, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025–27 (2009); Ho, supra note 10, at 64. 
See also Pension Markets in Focus, OECD (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/financialmarketsinsuranceandpensions/privatepensions/PensionMarketsInFocus201
2.pdf (illustrating the growing role of pension investments in developed economies).  
37 RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 160–70 (2006) (explaining the 
importance of risk diversification to increasing investors' risk-adjusted values); RICHARDSON, supra note 20, 
at 47, 193 (noting that the growth of institutional investment has expanded financial markets and resulted in a 
parallel reduction of direct family ownership). 
38 RICHARDSON, supra note 20, at 49. 
39 Greenfield & Smith, supra note 22, at 954. 
40 Black, supra note 35, at 820–26; RICHARDSON, supra note 20, at 265. 
41 Elhauge, supra note 11, at 817 (noting that individuals invested with institutional investors are 
likely to be even more insulated from social and moral sanctions). 
42 RICHARDSON, supra note 20, at 233–34; Elhauge, supra note 11, at 733 (noting that managerial 
incentives toward excessive generosity are constrained by various market forces that limit the ability to 
sacrifice profits); Lee, supra note 12, at 585 (noting that the liquidity of shareholders’ rights and the market 
for corporate control provide shareholders with protection against agency costs associated with excessively 
responsible corporate policies).  




The above analysis does not lead to the conclusion that investors’ muteness with 
respect to corporate conduct is a negative outcome.  Portfolio investors are not experts, 
and their excessive intervention in corporate affairs would perhaps have severe costs.  As 
long as there are other market mechanisms that reduce the agency costs of monitoring 
managers’ conduct, this muteness is actually an advantage.  Nevertheless, the ubiquity of 
large corporations in the global economy and the vital role they play (either by action or 
omission) in contemporary markets merit examination of some additional aspects of this 
voicelessness. 
III. POLITICAL CONCERNS OVER RATIONAL APATHY 
Having looked at the context of the recent interest in CSR in Part I, Part II 
examines the effect of corporate activity on the democratic political process.  Part II.A 
advances this article’s main normative argument that while portfolio investment is, by 
and large, a positive development that enables risk diversification, it has some negative 
externalities on the democratic political process.  These externalities are generated by the 
unaccountable and non-mandated political agency granted to corporate officers.  As the 
economic power of large corporations (particularly MNEs) continues to grow, this lack of 
political agency with respect to vital public policy issues should be understood as the core 
of the CSR critique.  Part II.C goes on to suggest that mandatory disclosure with respect 
to social and financial issues can legitimize corporate agency.  
A. The Political Costs of Rational Ignorance 
The analysis in this section questions the social construction of corporate agency 
with respect to shareholders.  Corporations are mainly investment vehicles, but, in the 
course of business, they inevitably interact with many issues that are political in nature.  
Because corporations are primarily designed to generate profits, traditional corporate law 
theory focuses on corporations’ economic agency, translating it into a fiduciary 
obligation to maximize shareholders’ wealth.44  Considerably less attention has been 
given to corporations’ political agency, which, I argue, is a form of accountability that 
does not follow smoothly from the economic agency practice.  
Financial markets and portfolio investment patterns allow investors to limit the 
cognitive resources they devote to managing their investments.
45
  However, these same 
attributes come into conflict with the democratic notions that emphasize the role of 
individuals’ informed, responsible decision-making.  Therefore, despite—and perhaps 
even because of—its risk diversification benefits, portfolio investment patterns also result 
in negative externalities on the democratic political process.  Portfolio investment 
encourages individuals to be morally and politically indifferent to the consequences of 
their investment decisions.  This is contrary to the ideals of a democratic regime that 
stresses the importance of individuals’ informed decision-making as the basis of public 
policy.  It is true that there are different approaches to how a democratic regime should 
function and that these approaches vary considerably in how they regard the importance 
of investing resources in order to encourage a broad body of citizens to engage in active 
                                                          
43 Elhauge, supra note 11, at 733. 
44 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
45 Victor J. Vanberg, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Market Economy: The Perspective of 
Constitutional Economy, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 131, 143. 
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decision-making.
46
  However, at their very core, all democratic societies rely on 
decentralized, individual decision-making and all of them require some level of active 
participation.
47
  In fact, one of the main functions of the state in a democratic regime is to 
facilitate mechanisms of deliberation that will allow informed, individual decision-
making to be effective in shaping public policy.
48
  
This article does not participate in the longstanding inquiry over what is the 
“proper” level of active political knowledge and engagement to which a democratic state 
should aspire.
49
  Instead, it wishes to emphasize why recent changes in the world 
economy have amplified the concern about investors’ rational apathy.  Historically, 
democratic societies did not regulate businesses solely by law.  Rather, regulation 
involved a combination of explicit government regulation and social norms that reflected 
both community expectations and individual consumer choices.
50
  
All of these mechanisms have become less effective in the increasingly 
integrated global economy.
51
  First, the opening of global markets introduced regulatory-
competition pressures, causing states to loosen their regulatory requirements to attract 
business investments.  This created a global atmosphere of weakened state regulatory 
capacity, which has made it difficult for states to effectively regulate issues related to 
business conduct within their individual jurisdictions, and even more difficult to 
effectuate responses to a growing set of issues that currently require coordinated global 
action.
52
  One of the best examples of this is the very well-documented dynamic of tax 
competition for MNE foreign direct investments.
53
  MNEs are sophisticated taxpayers 
that have access to and awareness of many tax reduction opportunities that are 
unavailable to other taxpayers.
54
  Corporate income taxation (by the source jurisdiction) 
                                                          
46 Liberal theorists tend to argue that political power in a representative democracy is no different 
from any other type of commodity—individuals and groups invest in society only to the extent that it 
promotes their interests. Deliberative and republican theorists of modern democracy tend to view active 
political participation as an act of virtue—participation improves democratic decision-making because it 
gives a larger role to consideration of the common good. See generally Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative 
Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1 (1994) (discussing three competing normative visions of 
democracy and emphasizing the role of deliberative discourse theory which emphasizes active citizenry 
involvement and communication as a middle path between the liberal and republican vision of democracy). 
47 For example, no democratic state allows vote buying or proxy voting. 
48 Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS 
ON REASON AND POLITICs 72 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997). 
49 For more on this point, see infra note 99.  
50 Stanley Deetz, Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility and Communication, in 
THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 267, 267; Elhauge, supra note 11, at 756–76. 
51 Deetz, supra note 50 at 267. 
52  Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK 414. 
53    There is a significant amount of empirical and theoretical economic research that reveals and 
explains why MNEs’ foreign investments are mobile and tax sensitive. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 188 (2006); Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and 
Tax Policy, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 703, 705 (2009); Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. 
Corporations Invest?, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 825, 825 (2000); Gaëtan Nicodème, On Recent Developments in 
Fighting Harmful Tax Practices, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 756, 756 (2009); Alan J. Auerbach et al., Taxing Corporate 
Income 22 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14494, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14494.pdf. 
54 They achieve these tax reduction opportunities primarily, though not exclusively, by engaging in 
tax planning transactions structured to shelter profits in subsidiaries within the MNE groups located in low-
tax jurisdictions. See generally Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011) 
(reviewing the different mechanisms through which MNEs achieve this form of tax reduction). 
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is the most important factor in determining MNEs’ worldwide tax exposure.55  This 
system creates a clear incentive for MNEs to engage in investment-shifting and income-
shifting behaviors and further motivates countries to respond to this demand.
56
  Because 
the tax competition dynamics for both investments and profits operate simultaneously 
and in an interrelated manner, it is difficult to distinguish between them.
57
  MNEs 
therefore are thought to have considerable influence on governments’ tax policy 
decisions, which impact their effective and marginal tax rates.
58
   
Second, the growing market share of corporate entities (especially MNEs) in the 
global economy suggests that they are important contributors to the current problems, an 
idea supported by the widely regarded notion that MNEs have a uniquely strong 
influence over the global economy.59  If policymakers manage to reduce some of the 
negative political externalities associated with investments in MNEs, this could have a 
meaningful impact on a range of public policy issues.
60
  For example, it has been argued 
                                                          
55 This means that shifting real investments to low-tax jurisdictions and shifting reported profits to 
them are both legally permissible strategies for increasing MNEs’ profitability. See Clausing, supra note 53, 
at 705. 
56 These two tax competitions—for investment and for profit shifting—intersect at many points. 
Whereas tax competition for capital investment reduces the effective marginal tax rate on new investments, 
tax competition for profits reduces statutory tax rates. See Michael P. Devereux, Ben Lockwood & Michela 
Redoano, Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1210, 1212–13, 1231 (2007) 
(developing and testing a model for such a two-dimensional tax competition—finding that countries 
simultaneously compete across both margins and that the competition for lower statutory tax rates is best 
explained in terms of competition over mobile profits); Michelle Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of 
Tax Research 38 (July 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1476561 (stating that there is significant evidence that 
differences in corporate tax rates affect firms’ pricing decisions).  
57 Clausing, supra note 53, at 717; Peter R. Merrill, Corporate Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 63 
NAT'L TAX J. 623, 630–31 (2010) (suggesting that the high corporate tax rates in the United States make it 
difficult to attract investment and to prevent profit-shifting); Michael Overesch, The Effects of 
Multinationals’ Profit Shifting Activities on Real Investments, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 5, 5 (2009);  Joel Slemrod, 
Location, (Real) Location, (Tax) Location: An Essay on Mobility’s Place in Optimal Taxation, 63 NAT'L TAX 
J. 843, 861–62 (2010) (suggesting that models that accommodate both tax competition for investment and 
profit locations are the most promising for future research development); George R. Zodrow, Capital 
Mobility and Capital Tax Competition, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 865, 869 (2010). 
58  For example, certain (mostly small) countries, typically thought of as tax havens, reduce their 
statutory tax rates to compete for profit shifting; i.e., to incentivize profit shifting by making it more 
lucrative. Other countries indirectly compete for investments by allowing MNEs to operate from tax havens 
when investing in them. By allowing MNEs to shift income out of their jurisdictions, these high tax countries 
indirectly reduce their effective tax rates. See generally Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, Tax Competition 
with Parasitic Tax Havens, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1261 (2009) (demonstrating that smaller tax countries chose to 
become tax havens to facilitate income-shifting and that abolishing these havens would improve global 
welfare). For a different view, see Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 923, 948, 951 (2010) (observing that in a world of capital disparities, smaller countries have an 
incentive to use their tax laws to attract economic activities by exploiting policies adopted by wealthier 
countries to mitigate double taxation). See also Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., Do Tax 
Havens Divert Economic Activity?, 90 ECON. LETTERS 219, 223 (2005); Dhammika Dharmapala, What 
Problems and Opportunities Are Created by Tax Havens?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 661, 662 (2008); 
Overesch, supra note 57, at 20; Benjamin Alarie, Price Discrimination in Income Taxation (January 30, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1796284 (arguing that many of the 
complexities in tax system could partly be understood as an attempt of tax authorities to compete for mobile 
investments and investors). 
59 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 721 (2002).  
60  RICHARDSON, supra note 20, at 520–22 (acknowledging that, despite his support of direct 
regulation, it may not be enough given the lack of direct governmental control over MNEs); Patricia H. 
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that corporate tax avoidance negatively affects the legitimacy of the tax system.61  When 
sophisticated taxpayers such as corporations are able to use tax planning devices to 
reduce their effective tax rate, it generates a feeling that the tax system does not provide 
private individuals with a fair shake.  As a result, this perception of unfairness or 
inequality legitimizes other avoidance (and perhaps even evasion) tax planning activities 
by non-corporate taxpayers. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, contemporary investors are exposed to an 
overwhelming number of ownership “relationships.”  Most of these are based on business 
ventures (a significant number are located beyond their country’s borders) about which 
the individual portfolio investors know little, if anything.
62
  Much of the effectiveness of 
social norm pressures, which are present in more localized, domestic economies, simply 
vanishes in the complex, global production chain.  One would expect that this alienation 
of shareholders from their investments would make the enforcement of non-legalistic 
methods of control virtually impossible due to common-action problems and, especially, 
the huge costs associated with shareholder activism.  
Corporate business strategy interacts and shapes political realities through the 
decisions made by corporate managers, who do so on behalf of their shareholders.  
However, in the context of widespread portfolio investment patterns, it is questionable 




The analysis up until this point stresses that the business sphere cannot be clearly 
separated from the political sphere, and therefore corporate managers act also as political 
agents because corporations’ activities have an inherent political impact.  Prima facie, 
this would not be problematic—democracy does not require individuals to decide on all 
the political issues that may affect them.  Accordingly, while vote buying is indeed 
forbidden, private transactions (including agency contracts) that have a political impact 
should not necessarily be subjected to high levels of regulatory scrutiny or approval.  
However, the shareholder-manager political agency relationship in public 
corporations is different from other private transactions in several respects.  First, the 
difficulties for portfolio shareholders of effectively monitoring their investments’ 
political impact make this political agency relationship unaccountable.  Second, 
corporations, particularly MNEs, are not ordinary private actors, but ones that have an 
ever-growing role in the modern global economy at a time when regulators find it 
increasingly difficult to exercise effective governmental control over their actions.  
Therefore, the shareholder-manager political agency relationship results in a significant 
democratic deficiency that has considerable implications for public policy (as well as on 
democratic theory). 
This suggests that the traditional CSR inquiry is slightly misplaced.  Instead of 
considering whether the efficiency costs of allowing managers to promote non-profit 
                                                                                                                                                              
Werhane, Corporate Social Responsibility/Corporate Moral Responsibility: Is There a Difference and the 
Difference It Makes, in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 459, 470. (Steve May et al. 
eds., 2007). 
61 Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the 'Unsourceable': The Cost Sharing Regulations and the Sourcing of 
Affiliated Intangibles-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 697 (2007).  
62 Lee, supra note 19, at 53 (asserting that corporate nature results in bounded feelings of empathy 
towards geographically remote victims of corporate irresponsibility). 
63 Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L. J. 1047, 1086–87 
(2009) (discussing this issue in the context of corporate philanthropy). 
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seeking goals are worth the benefits to society,
64
 the inquiry should be whether managers 
are adequate political agents of the shareholders they represent.  It is clear that managers 
are better placed than many other stakeholders in identifying the various costs and 
benefits of corporate conduct to third parties and society in general.
65
  However, this 
placement does not provide managers with any special moral or political weight when 
deciding issues such as the fairness of tax avoidance schemes, labor practices or the 
appropriate balance of sustainable growth against short-term profits. 
These types of questions relate to the goals that should be pursued and not the 
methods by which they should be pursued.  Therefore, the answers to these questions 
should be grounded in individual shareholders’ preferences on these issues and not 
resolved solely (or primarily) with deference to managers’ expertise. 
Framing CSR as a problem of political agency leads to a very different 
conclusion from that of the mainstream CSR literature.  Traditional literature focuses on 
how policymakers should obligate or incentivize managers to adopt certain desirable 
policies that could help solve specific problems associated with their business activities.
66
  
This article suggests that instead of trying to define what “good corporate citizenship” 
entails, policymakers should try to make corporations perform their political agency role 
adequately.  
As noted earlier, all of the issues attached to the CSR debate relate to the 
provision of public goods
67—how they should be provided, the desired amount, and 
prioritization relative to other public goods.  The reason there are so many CSR 
approaches stems from the (legitimate) differences in opinion with respect to what 
accounts for fair or optimal provision of public goods.  Neither governments nor markets 
can determine the “correct” answer to this question, simply because it depends on the 
aggregation of preferences of all members in a given society.  For example, in modern 
democracies, majoritarian decision-making is one way to determine the public goods that 
should be supplied by the government.  Majoritarian decision-making has its advantages 
(namely, that it can be applied coercively to eliminate free riding), but it also has its 
weaknesses (namely, the difficulty of achieving a stable coalition on a great number of 
issues).  People therefore try to promote their ideas about the necessity of public goods in 
other ways, such as through charitable donations,
68
 volunteering, and their daily business 
and non-business associations and interactions.  
What comprises legitimate tax planning or environmentally conscious business 
conduct is something that can only partially be agreed upon and advanced through 
government regulation.  Apart from what is illegal, individuals have heterogeneous 
preferences with respect to this controversial, yet fundamental issue.  Correspondingly, 
they may have different ideas as to how their position could be advanced, and can choose 
                                                          
64 See generally Elhauge, supra note 11, passim (convincingly arguing that, in many cases, 
allowing managers to engage in profit-sacrificing behavior to promote non-wealth maximization goals would 
not result in significant agency costs and would be efficient as a way of improving shareholders’ satisfaction 
by compensating for their lower financial returns). 
65 Johnston, supra note 20, at 234. 
66 Andere Crane et al., Introduction, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 3; Greenfield & Smith, supra note 22 
(arguing that providing management with more latitude to undertake socially conscious, non-profit 
maximizing initiatives is desirable).  
67 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
68 See generally Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (1998) (arguing that 
governments can use individuals' donations as a signal of their preferences). 
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among an almost infinite number of legal and legitimate ways to promote these ideas.  
Portfolio investment in public companies and MNEs is one of many such ways.  The 
reason it has attracted disproportionate scholarly attention relates to the growing 
importance of the corporate sector in the modern economy, as well as portfolio investors’ 
insulation and detachment from responsibility.  
To summarize, policymakers should refrain from adopting traditional CSR 
objectives, which focus on how to generate better corporate conduct.  Instead, they 
should place the political agency deficit, which results from individual shareholders’ 
rational indifference to political aspects of corporate conduct, as the main element of 
concern with respect to the current wealth-maximization ideals of the corporate law 
model.  According to this analysis, a CSR agenda should anchor its efforts in the need to 
compensate for the negative political externalities that this shareholder indifference 
imposes on the democratic political process.  This compensation requires taking 
institutional actions that would legitimize the unavoidable political agency of managers, 
while maintaining the benefits of the corporate structure and portfolio investment 
patterns.  Policymakers should take steps to ensure an active process of reflective 
equilibrium,
69
 which aims to ensure that corporate actions better correspond with 
shareholders’ preferences.  
B. Disclosure: A Remedy? 
The above analysis suggests that policymakers need to take actions to conform 
corporate political agency to democratic perceptions of individual responsibility.  This 
does not require any specific behavior; rather, it requires the establishment of 
mechanisms that align corporate governance practices with shareholders’ preferences.  
The challenge is not to tell corporations how to act, but to facilitate ways for shareholders 
to determine whether their investments match their preferences.  Democratic states 
provide tools that citizens can use to assume responsibility for their actions and 
participate in the democratic decision-making process.  Assuming responsibility over the 
political aspects of their portfolio investments requires, at the very least reliable and 
accessible information about the social and environmental impacts of corporate activity.  
Reliable information, which is necessary for democratic deliberation on public policy, is 
a public good, and private parties are not likely to voluntarily invest resources to provide 
it.  This implies that facilitating mandatory disclosure rules should be the main (or at least 
preliminary) goal of any government policy intended to enhance CSR. 
The first issue that policymakers should address is the choice of topics to be 
covered by any mandatory, non-financial disclosure regime.  In the same way that 
individuals are assumed to be interested (as shareholders) in generating profits, they 
could be assumed to be interested (as citizens) in a set of relevant political issues (which 
could be drawn from existing international legal documents).
70
  As mentioned above, the 
traditional CSR agenda is concerned with a broad set of issues that are all related to the 
question of how to best provide public goods, ranging from tax avoidance, anti-
corruption policies, and labor and environmental standards, to support of educational 
                                                          
69 Reflective equilibrium refers to a process in which beliefs are matched with actions. See Norman 
Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/reflective-equilibrium.  
70 Oliver F. Williams, Introduction, in PEACE THROUGH COMMERCE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE 
CITIZENSHIP AND THE IDEALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT 1, 1–3 (Oliver F. Williams ed., 
2008) (devoting an entire book to the U.N. global compact that deals with issues of CSR); Oshionebo, supra 
note 15, at 12–13.  
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initiatives.
71
  These goods differ from other commodities and services because the market 
cannot effectively supply them, since they involve considerable (negative or positive) 
externalities.  Hence, the optimal provision of these goods requires some type of 
governmental regulatory structure.  While arriving at a full set of issues is impossible, 
determining a set of issues that would interest reasonable or average shareholders is a 
feasible task.  In addition to the political issues concerning labor relations, human rights, 
and environmental concerns (discussed above), corporations should report their conduct 
with respect to other business-related political matters central to the global economy 
(e.g., tax compliance and relationships with foreign governments), their involvement in 
controversial industries (e.g., tobacco, pornography, and alcohol), and their own attempts 
to influence a political agenda (e.g., through campaign finance, charitable contributions, 
and lobbying activities).
72
  This list of topics is open, and may change from one society to 
another.  The main focus for selecting an issue is that individuals care about it as 
citizens—even if they do not vote in regard to it.73  
Policymakers who determine what a corporation must disclose effectively act as 
agenda setters, and this power is thus open for abuse.  This is a valid concern.  However, 
while there may be disagreement about whether certain issues should be included, others 
(e.g., political contribution, tax payment, environmental, and labor policies) are relatively 
straightforward.  Moreover, the alternative of disclosing only financial information also 
manifests a non-neutral agenda-setting with respect to the role of corporations in society.  
The discussion over the impact of social disclosure is not new.
74
  Like other 
disclosure regimes, social disclosure is often hailed as praiseworthy for its light, yet 
effective, regulatory touch, which can be used to advance an array of objectives.
75
  In 
supplementing direct regulatory requirements, it encourages moral behavior by relying on 
the market’s “taste” for morality and without hardwiring any moral principles into rigid 
                                                          
71 Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201–03, 1275–76 (1999) (arguing that social disclosure should 
include information about where products are produced, about corporations' environmental effects, and 
information about their labor practices). 
72 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83, 85–96 (2010) (explaining why corporate decisions, with respect to their political speech, 
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73 The majoritarian democratic decision-making process often makes it difficult to reach stable 
coalitions over a wide range of issues. Voters and politicians therefore often make decisions based on a 
limited set of issues (e.g., abortion, taxes, deficits, guns, and same-sex marriage). In a society where 
preferences over the desirability of public goods vary considerably, many groups would not be able to form 
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the full range of political preferences that individuals have. See Benshalom, supra note 63, at 1078–79. 
74 For some of the leading discussions in the legal literature concerning this issue, see Douglas M. 
Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539, 678–82 (1976); Williams, supra note 71, at 1307. 
75 Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. 
REV. 1089, 1108–13 (2007) (surveying the different regulatory functions of disclosure, including: making 
markets more efficient, monitoring compliance with standard laws and regulations, providing information for 
government, and increasing public awareness). But see Steven M. Davidoff & Claire. A. Hill, Limits of 
Disclosure, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2013) (critically asserting that disclosure is too often a convenient path 
for policymakers and many others looking to take action and hold onto comforting beliefs in the face of a bad 
outcome).  




This article highlights a different aspect, and argues that disclosure should not be 
viewed as a second-best supplement to direct regulation.  Instead, due to the growth in 
corporate activities, disclosure should become an important way of exerting broad civic 
influence over public policy.  
If policymakers require corporations to disclose their impacts on social and 
environmental issues, some of the negative political externalities associated with 
investors’ rational indifference would be corrected.77  The following attributes of the 
disclosure regime suggest that having widely available information on corporations’ 
impacts would facilitate a shareholder-corporation political agency relationship that 
better accounts for shareholders’ multiple capacities and heterogeneity of preferences. 
First, disclosure seems to align with the notion of political agency—it does not 
require corporations to undertake any specific action but just to be transparent about their 
choices in acting.
78
  The actual impact of this disclosure, the pressures it would expose 
corporations to, and the type of corporate responses to them are of less importance as 
long as its respective audience keeps the information internal.
79
  Second, disclosure 
requirements bridge the inherent information asymmetry between portfolio investors and 
managers, providing investors with the possibility of making informed and accountable 
decisions with respect to the broader social impact of their investment decisions.
80
  
Systematic, comparable disclosure is a necessary first step in allowing shareholders to 
exercise a more sophisticated choice to ensure that their investments conform to their 
overall preferences.
81
  Third, mandatory disclosure accompanied by legal sanctions 
would significantly reduce problems of fraud and green-washing.
82
  This in turn could 
help legitimize the political agency relationship by providing an assurance that 
corporations (as agents) are truthful about their social and environmental impacts.
83
  
                                                          
76 This allows disclosure regimes to fit within the comfort level of liberal democracies and their 
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82 Branson, supra note 74, at 624–27. 
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In summary, to be legitimate within a democratic regime, public corporations 
should have a credible disclosure regime that highlights the way in which policies 
affecting salient political issues are formed.  
C. Assessment of the Proposal  
The process of compiling data on corporate social performance would be of a 
very large scale.  Mandatory disclosure requires significant resources for verifying the 
accuracy of information in order to reduce the risk of liability.
84
  There is a market for 
information about the social and environmental impact of corporations, which is used by 
socially responsible (institutional) investors.  Hence, those advocating for a shift to a 
mandatory disclosure regime bear the burden of proving that this information market is 
not operating properly.
85
  Additionally, as mentioned, financial markets offer a liquid 
investment environment that is characterized by low exit costs.  In such a setting, even 
low-stake portfolio investors can easily opt out from investing in corporations that do not 
satisfy their preferences.  When exit is easy, there seems to be no need to regulate the 
shareholder voice.  As socially responsible investment funds demonstrate, investors who 
are interested in non-financial aspects of corporate activities can channel their 
investments through professional fund managers who take these considerations into 
account. 
There are a number of responses to these concerns.  The first is that shareholders 
wish to correctly price the relative value of assets in which they invest in accordance with 
the increase in welfare they expect to derive from those assets.  In order to make these 
decisions, they need both financial and non-financial information.  The analysis in earlier 
parts of this article demonstrated that the current (mostly) voluntary non-financial 
disclosure regime is materially deficient.
86
  In other cases, such as information regarding 
the different tax positions of corporations, government officials operate under strict 
restrictions of confidentiality.
87
  These types of restrictions effectively prohibit the supply 
of such information to investors. 
This point questions the assumption that the reason portfolio investors have a 
cheap exit cost option is to allow them to shift out of investing in corporations that do not 
satisfy their preferences.  The low quality of socially responsible investment practices, 
which are a byproduct of poor corporate reporting practices, suggests that the information 
is not available to make a decision based on their preferences.  Therefore, the only option 
shareholders have is to shift out of portfolio investment altogether.
88
  This is a very costly 
exit option, which individual shareholders cannot be reasonably expected to incur, and, 
on a broader level, it has a negative impact on the economy, since low transaction cost 
portfolio investment has many positive benefits.
89
  Instead, policymakers should seek 
other ways, such as mandatory social disclosure, to minimize the negative externalities of 
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88 See supra Part II.C.  
89 See supra notes 35–37. 
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rational ignorance on the political process. 
The second response is that corporations already maintain information about 
various social aspects of their activities, especially with respect to their tax compliance.90  
Indeed, tax authorities and other regulatory agencies in developed countries often require 
corporations to disclose such information to them.  Generating much of the relevant 
information should therefore not be too costly for MNEs operating in developed 
countries.  While compiling it into standardized reports would require some additional 
resources, it would also reduce some of the costs associated with the multiple standards 
applied today (by voluntary disclosure initiatives).  Furthermore, one could expect that a 
mandatory disclosure requirement would encourage the development of specialized 
auditing firms, which would help further reduce some of those costs through economies 
of scope and scale. 
The second line of criticism regarding mandatory disclosure of non-financial 
information is that it would remain wasteful and distortive even if compliance costs could 
be reduced to manageable levels.  According to this train of thought, as long as 
consumers, managers, and investors are primarily price-sensitive (a point which even 
CSR sympathizers acknowledge),
91
 any resources invested in disclosure would be better 
spent elsewhere.  It does not matter why all these individuals are price sensitive—
whether it is because they fail to care about non-financial issues or because of common 
action problems that keep them blissfully ignorant and prevent them from effectively 
pursuing other preferences.  Either way, the point remains that the costs associated with a 
mandatory requirement to disclose non-financial information will not affect individuals’ 
consumption and investment behaviors and they therefore are unjustified.  While a 
market operating with full information is an ideal, there is no point in trying to achieve it 
if people are unlikely to respond to additional information in any significant way.
92
 
Despite its veneer of empirical correctness, this critique is probably overly 
deterministic and pessimistic as an empirical matter.
93
  Moreover, from a normative 
perspective, it fails to grasp the political agency argument advanced by this article.  
Specifically, it fails to recognize that competitive, price-sensitive market pressures in 
corporate stock markets are only one sphere through which society interacts with 
corporate power.  Regulation, taxation, organized labor, and civic activism are other 
potential avenues that could influence the role corporations play in society.
94
  Repeat 
actors operating in these spheres would probably be more sophisticated and attentive to 
the disclosed information than the average portfolio investor.  Hence, there is a higher 
probability that they would respond to and make use of credible, easy to compare, and 
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easy to access information with respect to corporate conduct on these issues.
95
 
This line of argument can be framed in two ways.  The first relies on the efficient 
market analysis, which assumes that sophisticated institutional investors consume 
financial information disclosed by firms and correct the prices of assets in the market 
according to this information.  This “market efficiency hypothesis” is the essence of 
modern finance theory.  The development of portfolio investment is based on this 
assumption, allowing investors to be rationally ignorant when investing their capital in 
the financial markets.  The belief that sophisticated actors are able to use the information 
provided by firms to price assets with reasonable accuracy allows investors to avoid 
expending resources trying to price those assets themselves.
96
  
The same argument should be made with respect to social disclosure.
97
  There is 
a competitive market for political support of various ideas and initiatives.  The success of 
the non-financial information market with respect to corporate conduct does not depend 
only on whether individual investors change their behavior according to it in a direct 
way.  As long as there is reliable information cheaply available, sophisticated parties—
e.g., NGOs, news organizations, unions, political parties and business competitors—
would be able to use this information and translate it into “outrage costs,” which could 
help trigger political and media reactions to the issue.
98
 
While disclosure is unlikely to impact the investment decisions of (rationally 
ignorant) individuals or (primarily price-sensitive) institutional investors, it would likely 
impact corporate behavior by imposing pressures in other spheres.  Interested parties 
would use this information to trigger consumer and political reactions to corporate 
conduct.  Chances of manipulation of the disclosed information are low as long as the 
information provided is reasonably accurate, reliable, and comprehensive.  The 
dissemination of this information would result in a richer and more reflective debate on 
the various dimensions of what comprises legitimate business conduct. 
The notion that social disclosure could only be justified if it is proven that 
individuals actively consume it and directly act upon it is misleading.  Furthermore, this 
notion stands in deep opposition to the basic assumption that corporate law and finance 
scholars adopt in their analyses with respect to financial disclosure. 
Another approach to this issue could stress how investment decisions are not 
fundamentally different from voting decisions.  As public choice scholars have noted, the 
general public has minimal incentive to participate in the democratic process, and even 
less incentive to invest time and cognitive resources in trying to make informed decisions 
about questions of public policy.
99
  Since politicians can easily manipulate the public, the 
notion that providing more information would help individuals in improving their choice 
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of their representatives—so that those representatives would better advance their 
preferences—is naïve.  In this state of affairs, there is a very low likelihood that 
individuals could change democratic decision-making; apathy is the most rational 
behavior.  
There is a startling resemblance between these public choice arguments with 
respect to voting and the criticism against the social disclosure regime.  According to 
both arguments, the attempt to provide relevant information that would help individuals 
in making informed decisions constitutes a waste of resources.  Yet the public choice 
critique seems to offer only one (pessimistic) dimension of a much more complicated 
process.  For example, according to public choice theory, voting is an irrational behavior 
because the ability of one voice to influence the result of large elections is negligible.  
Despite this apparent irrationality, a significant number of people exercise their voting 
rights in national elections.  
In the context of disclosure, public choice would stress the uselessness of almost 
all disclosure mechanisms.  Nevertheless, basically all democratic regimes try to promote 
transparency of government decision-making and decision-makers.  Despite their 
skepticism about the impact of each and every disclosure initiative, every public choice 
theorist would most likely (everything else being equal) prefer to live in a country with 
more governmental transparency (e.g., Finland) rather than less (e.g., Russia).  Even 
though it is difficult to determine the utility of each part of the public disclosure regime, 
the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts.  People take the importance of 
disclosure for granted as part of a broader commitment to a free democratic process.  This 
is not coincidental; the core of the democratic process is premised upon individuals’ 
ability to use their informed judgments to monitor and take responsibility over the actions 
of elected representatives.  
Just as in the case of public sector disclosure, disclosure of information 
concerning the non-financial social and environmental aspects of corporate activity may 
be justified out of a broad political commitment to transparency.  Policymakers should 
require corporations to provide information about the political impact of their business 
activities because transparency promotes proper use of political power.  Corporate 
managers are agents of their shareholders in a way that resembles how elected politicians 
are agents of voters in a representative democracy.  This resemblance results from the 
growing importance of corporations in impacting issues of public policy in the integrated 
global economy.  Policymakers therefore have justification to impose high transparency 
requirements on corporate agents even if it is hard to determine the precise costs and 
benefits of every component of the disclosure policy. 
An additional point should be made with respect to the quality of the information 
disclosed.  In financial markets, policymakers can assume that simply providing the 
information is sufficient because there is efficiency even if the information is understood 
only by a limited number of professionals.  This, arguably, is not the case in the context 
of non-financial disclosure, where the range of sophistication of parties is much wider.  
To achieve disclosure that can expose the political impact of corporations to outsider 
scrutiny, the information should be transparent, and not just technically available.
100
  It 
must be presented in a way that is more than just accurate—disclosure must operate 
under guidelines that require auditors to illustrate the saliency of the provided 
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information.  Policymakers face a difficult dilemma of whether to settle for a relatively 
light touch disclosure regime, or to try a much more difficult (and costly) regime that 
promotes transparency.  The balance between these two approaches varies from one field 
to another.  Part III provides a single in-depth analysis of what I consider to be the most 
straightforward application of the analysis: corporate tax disclosure. 
In summary, the notion of social and environmental disclosure is an 
administrable policy alternative that would be effective in promoting normatively 
legitimate corporate agency.  Although far from offering any clear-cut and no-cost 
solution, the proposal offers a solution that conforms to notions of democratic 
accountability based on a process of informed decision-making and, therefore, should be 
considered seriously by policymakers. 
IV. THE CASE FOR TAX DISCLOSURE 
This Part takes the previous theoretical analysis a step further by presenting the 
case of tax disclosure as an example of how the deficit of corporate political agency 
should be incrementally addressed.  The ambition of this article is not to reduce 
corporate tax planning per se, but only to ensure that corporate tax planning strategies 
conform with shareholders’ (and public) conceptions of what comprises legitimate 
planning behavior.  
Tax disclosure operates as the ideal case study for demonstrating how the 
concept of corporate political agency bears concrete results in analyzing CSR issues and 
for explaining how disclosure can reduce the negative political externalities associated 
with rational ignorance.  By demonstrating that social disclosure would be possible even 
with respect to such a technical and difficult issue, this article hopes to establish the 
plausibility and significance of its underlying proposal.  To achieve this, the article draws 
some broad-brush lines between its analysis and recent literature on tax disclosure.
101
 
The first attribute of tax disclosure that makes it an ideal case study is its 
negligible marginal costs—corporations already produce and deliver the relevant 
information to tax authorities.  The second is its political relevance as an issue of tax 
policy.  The third, and most important, attribute is the seeming gap between shareholders’ 
positions on tax avoidance and the actual conduct of corporations. 
A. Corporate Tax Planning: A Clear Case of Political Agency Deficit 
Although taxation, particularly corporate and international taxation, is viewed as 
a complex topic, it is not fundamentally different from other CSR issues involving 
MNEs’ creative compliance strategies.  Creative compliance with regulatory 
requirements is a byproduct of a number of factors, including ambiguity about legal 
norms, insufficient funding of state enforcement agencies, and corporate access to 
(typically legal) expertise specializing in reducing the regulatory burden.
102
  Even though 
it is similar to other CSR issues, corporations’ tax payment strategies have attracted 
relatively little CSR-oriented research.
103
  The following analysis demonstrates why 
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MNEs’ tax planning strategies highlight the problems associated with their lack of 
corporate political agency and explains how this could be remedied by a better flow of 
information.  
A case study of MNEs’ tax avoidance strategies is interesting because managers’ 
ability to minimize corporate tax liabilities goes to the heart of their duty to maximize 
profits.  Traditional (wealth maximization-oriented) corporate law analysis views 
corporate tax payment as a transfer made by shareholders, as the residual owners, to the 
government.
104
  Hence, because tax planning is not a prohibited criminal activity, 
minimization of corporate tax liabilities is a permissible way to increase shareholders’ 
return for their investments. At least in theory,
105
 it seems as though managers have an 
obligation to disregard their personal views about tax avoidance and minimize their 
corporation’s tax liabilities via any legal, albeit aggressive, planning option available.  
This obligation may strike some as odd, since many shareholders may not 
support this standard of behavior when it comes to tax planning.  Individuals have widely 
different views about tax avoidance and tax planning.  While some view it as a legitimate 
attempt to minimize tax liabilities, others view it as a distasteful, irresponsible, and 
immoral practice.  Some scholars argue that (with very few exceptions) all tax planning 
initiatives are negative and wasteful.
106
  Other scholars view some corporate tax planning 
practices more favorably.
107
  The existence of the large volumes of literature that consider 
what comprises legitimate tax avoidance demonstrates the plurality of views on this topic 




The relative neglect of corporate tax minimization strategies in CSR literature is 
surprising because tax payment (and lack of tax payment) has unquestionable welfare 
consequences on other members of society.  Corporate tax planning has the consequence 
of the government being paid less money.
109
  This generally has a negative impact on 
other members of society, requiring the state to either reduce public provisions, due to its 
reduced spending capacity, or to increase the tax burden on its members to 
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compensate.
110
  In fact, as some important public finance scholars have noted, corporate 
tax payments—especially income tax payments—are the most visible and straightforward 
contribution that corporations make to non-shareholders and non-employees.
111
  
However one views tax avoidance, individuals clearly have diverse preferences 
on the issue.  This diversity has some real world consequences. Individuals or companies 
with higher “tax morals,” or (as economists would frame it) higher subjective costs, are 
less likely to engage in tax planning, and are in turn exposed to higher tax rate burdens.
112
  
While aggressive tax planning can have significant financial and reputational costs,
113
 
there is little empirical indication that these costs play any role in determining share 
prices.
114
  Hence, differences in tax morals and professional ethics can help explain why 
corporations exhibit such great variances in their tax planning and, specifically, why 
allegedly rational corporate managers are willing to overpay taxes that they could avoid 
by investing in tax sheltering activities.  All of this demonstrates that what constitutes 
legitimate tax planning behavior remains an open question, and one that cuts to the very 
essence of what comprises ethical business conduct.
115
 
Members of society have clear and tangible incentives to “free ride” by letting 
others pay taxes without doing so themselves.  In this context, the reasons that 
determining what constitutes legitimate tax planning is such a highly controversial 
political and ethical topic are clear.  Taxpayers have a right to structure their transactions 
in any way they choose, and it is difficult to determine if any one structure serves a 
reasonable objective or is primarily an attempt to free ride off of other tax-paying 
members of society.  The fact that the question is unsettled provides the reason for 
mandatory disclosure, so that shareholders can make a determination according to their 
own political preferences.  As discussed in Part III, comprehensive and readily 




Current shareholder wealth maximization financial reporting requirements do not 
require specific details with respect to corporate tax planning strategies.  Therefore, a tax 
planning device used by a corporation should be reported only if it can substantially 
affect its income projections.  In doing so, the current requirements require corporations 
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to provide the type of information that “rational” investors and creditors interested only 
in increasing their wealth would demand—that is, only information that impacts a given 
corporation’s financial stability.117  In fact, the information provided by public 
corporations’ financial statements is generally not sufficient to isolate and compare even 
very basic information such as annual tax liabilities and payments in a given year.
118
 
From a social perspective, shareholders’ general lack of knowledge and ability to 
comprehend the conduct of corporate agents is far from optimal.  Given the powerful 
arguments that tax planning has little, if any, positive social welfare effects on society, 
this seems to be a relatively straightforward case in which the rational ignorance among 
shareholders encourages corporate managers to engage in behaviors that have negative 
social welfare effects overall.  The relatively smooth operation of modern self-reporting 
tax systems is possible because of individuals’ reluctance to maximize their financial 
returns by exploiting tax loopholes and evasion opportunities.
119
  Because sanctions alone 
are insufficient in deterring aggressive tax planning behavior, tax authorities also have to 
rely on the social norms of ethical tax compliance among sophisticated corporate actors.  
In this context, the detachment of shareholders from knowledge and accountability makes 
corporate tax compliance more difficult to achieve.  Put differently, current wealth 
maximization-oriented corporate law and financial disclosure regimes encourage 
corporations to turn their tax departments into “profit centers.”120  
These incentives to turn tax minimization into a business strategy may strike 
some as odd since large corporations, particularly MNEs, are not ordinary taxpayers; 
rather, they are the ones responsible for most of a country’s corporate income tax 
revenue.
121
  Furthermore, MNEs, as taxpayers, have a large number of tax reduction 
opportunities because they operate in multiple jurisdictions, employ economies of scope 
and scale, maintain considerable lobbying power, and have access to tax planning 
expertise.  Unsurprisingly, the result of tax planning by these large corporate taxpayers is 
extremely costly in terms of foregone revenue.
122
  This result is neither neutral nor 
reasonable from a social perspective.  Nevertheless, it is a predictable outcome, given the 
rational response of managers to the incentives that current financial disclosure rules 
provide.  
B. Tax Disclosure: From Theory to Practice 
This subpart provides a basic summary of the literature dealing with tax 
disclosure, describing some of the key strengths and weaknesses of public disclosure of 
corporate tax information.  It then turns to examine this article’s analysis about the 
negative political externalities of non-disclosure.  The next subpart contextualizes these 
conclusions by explaining how tax disclosure would operate with respect to a recent, 
well-publicized tax minimization strategy employed by Apple.  
Tax disclosure has been employed in the United States in the past,
123
 and is still 
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employed in various (primarily Scandinavian) countries, where taxpayers are required to 
report their tax liabilities.
124
  Historically, the tax disclosure debate has revolved around a 
somewhat different axis than that presented in this analysis—namely, whether it can help 
improve tax compliance.
125
  The idea was that wealthy people would be afraid to disclose 
the fact that they make low tax payments that do not correspond with their financial 
abilities and living standards.  The issue re-emerged at the beginning of the millennium in 
the aftermath of several corporate-accounting scandals.
126
  When Enron collapsed, news 
coverage revealed that it and other fraudulent corporations reported enormous financial 
accounting profits to their shareholders but little taxable income to the government.  
Hence, the renewed interest in public disclosure of tax information sprang from the 
notion that large corporations were engaged in too much tax sheltering, and that this was 
a symptom of a greater problem in the business ethics of corporate America.
127
 
It remains difficult to determine which taxpayers should be covered by tax 
disclosure requirements, and what information they should disclose.  Disclosing tax 
return information is obviously in conflict with the notion of taxpayers’ privacy 
protection.  Today, taxpayer privacy is such an important principle that the Internal 




There seems to be agreement that full disclosure of corporate tax returns is 
undesirable.
129
  First, while public corporations do not have a right to privacy in the same 
way in which individuals do, there is a fear that tax disclosure would force them to 
disclose sensitive proprietary information to their competitors.  Second, full disclosure 
would require corporations to disclose an enormous amount of information and would 
provide them with an incentive to dilute the quality of the tax information in a way that 
would obfuscate, rather than highlight, their relevant tax planning strategies.
130
  
On the other hand, it is clear that a tax disclosure regime that only provides 
crude, aggregated information—such as total tax liability and effective tax rate—is also 
insufficient.  A tax disclosure regime that relies only on such data would reveal more 
information than what is currently available, but would not enable shareholders to grasp 
the nature of corporate tax reduction activities.  Furthermore, the idea that the disclosure 
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of aggregated data is sufficient rests on the assumption that there is a clear social norm 
with regard to lowering one’s tax rates.  However, in our political-legal culture, there is 
widespread ambivalence about whether paying fewer taxes is, indeed, antisocial 
behavior.
131
  Corporations that reduce their tax liabilities are often considered 
sophisticated, especially since governments intentionally provide many of these tax 
reduction opportunities.  Indeed, as mentioned, the problem with tax planning lies in the 




The above analysis does not deny that any tax disclosure regime that wishes to 
foster political agency with respect to corporate tax payment would need to include 
aggregated data (e.g., taxes paid at effective tax rates on domestic and foreign incomes).  
However, aggregated data would also need to include some information that provides a 
stronger signal for controversial, tax planning behavior.  Such controversial information 
should include levels of investment and engagement in tax sheltering transactions, 
penalties paid to the IRS, the amount of money saved through authorized tax 
minimization strategies, and explanations for every major difference between tax and 
financial accounting figures.  
This type of information would be more intrusive and, therefore, more expensive 
(and politically difficult) to generate.  However, it is important to recognize that the vast 
majority of this information already exists, and is already provided to the IRS.
133
  This 
suggests that the costs of generating the information are only those costs associated with 
detaching relevant information from the rest of the tax return and “translating” it into a 
format that is easier to read and comprehend.  
Within the limited framework of this case study, it is impossible to review every 
technical aspect of such requirements.  However, it is important to note that this regime 
could be made more effective through a set of simple procedures.  These would include 
penalties for over or misleading disclosure, a list of safe haven elements that do not 
require disclosure, and a requirement to provide a written description of corporate 
strategies and tax planning transactions.
134
  The next subpart provides a real world 
example that contextualizes the analysis. 
C. The Open Debate about Apple’s Stateless (and Tax-Less) Subsidiaries 
This section will consider a tax-planning device that recently received 
considerable public attention: Apple’s “stateless subsidiaries.”135  For simplicity, this 
article focuses on the first component of this multistep transaction,
136
 which allowed 
                                                          
131 For such an approach, see the opinion of Judge Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 
(2d Cir. 1934). 
132 See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.  
133 Blank, supra note 129, at 1635–42 (describing the current listed transactions, mandatory 
disclosure regime that requires corporations to report every time they engage in transactions that are 
considered “suspicious”). 
134 Id. at  1672–86. 
135 Memorandum from Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, and Sen. John McCain, Ranking Minority 
Member, Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, to the Members of the Subcomm. on Investigations (May 
21, 2013), at 17-37 available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/download/?id=fc514a8c-5890-47c4-ba7c-
149e4a8474c2. 
136 See  Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 706–13 (2011) (skillfully 
describing a similar transaction involving Google). 
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Apple to shift its intangibles to a subsidiary incorporated in Ireland.
137
  
With the authorization of the IRS, Apple initially injected equity capital into a 
subsidiary incorporated in Ireland, which otherwise had very little activity.  This capital 
was then used by the subsidiary to purchase a share in intangible assets, which had been 
developed by the U.S. parent, mostly through the human capital of its American 
employees.  The transaction was complexly engineered to allow the income earned by the 
subsidiary to be shifted outside of Ireland, in essence allowing the subsidiary to become 
stateless; i.e., for tax purposes, it was located nowhere.  Instead of paying the ordinary 
Irish tax rate of 12.5%, Apple “negotiated [with Ireland] a special corporate tax rate [for 
its stateless subsidiaries] of less than 2%.”138 
Despite the overall complexity, the core of the transaction was relatively simple.  
Apple, a corporation operating mostly from Cupertino, California, raised capital and 
invested it in innovative R&D activity.
139
  In the process of doing so, it probably 
deducted most of its R&D and finance costs from the parent’s domestic tax liabilities.  
Then, with a stroke of a pen, it capitalized what eventually became a stateless subsidiary 
with equity capital.  This equity investment was used by the subsidiary to purchase 
ownership rights in the highly profitable, intangible assets of the U.S. parent corporation 
(a purchase that probably triggered some type of tax liability).  Almost immediately after 
this capital arrived in the subsidiary’s bank account, it re-crossed the Atlantic to the 
parent’s bank account.  Over the years, the subsidiary made subsequent payments under 
the cost sharing agreement financed through its vastly accumulated (and modestly taxed) 
retained earnings, which, despite Apple’s modest physical presence in Ireland, accounted 
for two thirds of its profits.
140
  Given that Apple controlled 100% of these stateless 
subsidiaries, all these actions amounted to no more than paper shuffling—moving money 
from one corporate pocket to another. 
Even though the United States taxes MNEs on foreign earnings, the accumulated 
earnings of Apple’s stateless subsidiaries were unlikely to be taxed.  Following the 
general rule that earnings are only taxed when realized, the Apple parent would only pay 
taxes on these earnings once they repatriated as dividends in the United States.
141
  Hence, 
absent serious earnings or liquidity shocks, Apple has no incentive to repatriate those 




Apple is a unique MNE. It is among the most profitable corporations in the world 
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and its business relies on the production of highly profitable intangible assets.  
Furthermore, its multinational scope allows it to undertake tax-planning opportunities 
unavailable to purely domestic corporations.  It is, at the same time, a corporation that 
invests a lot in its brand name and reputation.  Most importantly, as a widely held public 
corporation, it is likely that the vast majority of American taxpayers are Apple 
shareholders (either directly or indirectly, through pension savings accounts).  
Apple’s actions were taken to maximize its shares’ value.143  They were all legal 
and, to a certain extent, authorized by the IRS.  Nevertheless, the public exposure of this 
tax reduction technique triggered a large-scale, sophisticated debate in all major news 
organizations about the taxation of MNEs, in which a wide array of views were 
presented.
144
   
The debate revealed that there is no single agreed upon answer to whether 
Apple’s behavior was right or wrong.145  The answer to this question depends on many 
factors, including personal political preferences and the extent to which other 
corporations employ similar strategies.  Due to the ambiguity surrounding the question of 
whether this is a legitimate tax planning practice, a tax disclosure regime will not 
necessarily reduce the use of this type of planning device.  Instead, such a regime would 
require Apple and other companies to disclose this strategy, as well as other tax reduction 
strategies, not only to the IRS, but also to shareholders, which, in the case of Apple, are 
the general public.  Certainly, there is only a low probability that revealing this would 
affect investment decisions.  It would more likely trigger a better-informed debate among 
a broader circle of (non-tax expert) citizens in the general public.  This type of debate 
may induce tax policymakers to reconsider the limitations that should be placed on such 
corporate tax reduction opportunities.  
The current information about public corporations does not provide shareholders 
with sufficient information to make judgments on these issues.  Instead, this information 
is made available primarily through sporadic news coverage and is thus generally 
anecdotal and in and out of the public agenda.  This state of affairs is undesirable 
considering shareholders’ different preferences with respect to tax planning.  For 
example, some shareholders may think corporations should pay more taxes and that 
Apple’s actions were plainly unfair.  Others may think corporations like Apple should be 
rewarded directly for creating high paying jobs in the United States and not indirectly 
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through tax reduction opportunities that involve moving intangibles to stateless 
subsidiaries abroad.  Others still may think Apple applied a legitimate self-help strategy 




It is highly probable that the full spectrum of these views could be found among 
Apple’s shareholders.  However, the purely internal mechanism through which these 
types of decisions take place today avoids the political and moral debate altogether by 
relegating the essentially moral and political question of what comprises free riding in the 
context of tax planning to Apple’s CEO, CFO, tax executives, and (to a limited extent) its 
board of directors.  Contemporary financial disclosure rules give corporate decision-
makers incentives only to increase the financial returns of their shareholders, which make 
their decisions to undertake tax-planning strategies easy to understand.  This state of 
affairs is not “natural” or neutral—it is one that can and should be changed.  Requiring 
public corporations to incorporate more nuanced information about their tax 
minimization strategies, as outlined above, would facilitate the emergence of a more 
informed public debate about these issues.  
Tax planning is but one of many issues in which disclosure can promote a more 
accountable corporate political agency.  The low costs of producing relevant information 
and the salience of tax policy issues in contemporary political debates make corporate tax 
disclosure the easiest to implement and the most straightforward avenue to promote such 
accountability.  All thousand-mile journeys start with a single step, and corporate tax 
disclosure offers the first step in this one. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The article’s proposal aims to better reflect upon corporate tax planning behavior 
through the lens of political agency.  Increased or mandatory tax disclosure would 
encourage a more sincere and accountable public debate about the impact of 
corporations’ tax-planning activities and, more broadly, about the role of corporate power 
in a democracy.  This article does not encourage controversial behaviors such as tax 
avoidance and does not offer a substitute for direct methods of tax enforcement 
regulation.  Instead, it provides the framework upon which complicated tax and non-tax 
political-regulatory decisions could adequately and transparently be made in recognition 
of an inherent corporate political agency. 
 This article’s main argument is anchored by the notion that, in a democratic 
society, political decisions should be made by a well-informed and accountable body of 
citizens.  The alienation of non-control shareholders from their investments creates 
political agency costs that conflict with this notion of democratic decision-making.  
Current corporate law allows portfolio investors to distance themselves from their 
responsibility over the impact of their investment activities, resulting in managers using 
the people’s money to make political decisions that affect the people.  These agency costs 
have been overlooked by the corporate law and public finance scholarship dealing with 
tax disclosure. 
This article refrains from offering a solution that aims to solve all of these related 
issues.  Instead, it focuses on addressing the problem of corporate political agency by 
advocating mandatory disclosure, taking the position that what the eye does not see, the 
heart does not feel.  The main objective of this solution is to provide relevant and 
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accessible data to investors (mediated by “professional” actors) about the impact of their 
investments.  The article’s proposal aims to better reflect upon corporate tax planning 
behavior rather than achieving any specific result.  The solution encourages a more 
sincere and accountable public debate about the impact of corporate tax planning 
strategies.  Therefore, the article’s proposal should not be viewed as legitimizing tax 
planning or as a substitute for more direct methods of confronting abusive tax planning 
strategies.  Instead, it provides the public debate framework upon which these 
complicated political-tax decisions could transparently be made. 
